Recently, a number of results have been published related to simultaneous rigid E-uni cation and Herbrand's theorem for logic with equality. The aim of this article is to overview these results, ll in some proofs that have only been sketched before, and present some new results. 2 2
Contents
Herbrand's theorem is one of the major tools in automated deduction in classical logic. The tableau method, the connection method and model elimination are based on a direct use of this theorem. Variants of Herbrand's theorem are used in completeness proofs for nearly all methods of automated deduction, including variants of resolution. Recently, a number of results about Herbrand's theorem and proof-search for logic with equality have been published. This article aim at presenting results in this area and lling in proofs of some results that have been announced by not formally justi ed.
We also give more precise formulations of results with respect to the signatures in which problems are formulated and provide a table of known results.
Preliminaries
The equality predicate is denoted . The symbol`denotes provability in classical logic. By x 1 7 ! t 1 ; : : : ; x n 7 ! t n ] we denote the substitution that replaces variables x i by terms t i . If is a substitution and t is a term, then t denotes the term obtained from t by applying . An expression (e.g. a term or a set of terms) is called ground if it contains no variables.
We only consider rst-order formulas. We assume that every signature considered in this article contains at least one constant. The signature of a formula ' is the signature consisting of all symbols occurring in ', plus one xed constant if ' contains no constants. If all variables of a formula ' are x, we denote by 9' the formula 9x'.
Some of results depend on the signature and logic in which formulas are written. We consider two logics: with and without equality. If a signature consists of k constants, l unary function symbols, and m function symbols of arity 2, we shall denote such a signature by (k; l; m). We shall also use ordinals and wildcards in the notation for signatures. For example, (!; ; 3) denotes any signature with in nitely many constants, any number of unary function symbols, and 3 function symbols of arity 2. Similarly, (< !; 0; 0) denotes a signature with any nite number of constants and no function symbols of arity 1. Signatures without function symbols of arity 2, i.e., ( ; ; 0) are called monadic.
A literal is either an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula. Literals that are atomic formulas are called positive, and literals that are negations of atomic formulas negative. A formula is in negation normal form if it is constructed from literals using^; _; 8; 9.
We use the terms \unsatis able" and \inconsistent" as synonyms.
A sequent is an expression ? ! , where ? and are multisets of formulas. In this article, we shall use several sequent calculi. Let us x some terminology related to derivations in such calculi.
An inference rule is an n-ary relation on the set of sequents, where n 1. The elements of such a relation are called inferences and usually written as S 1 : : : S n?1 S :
We call the sequents S 1 ; : : : ; S n?1 premises, and the sequent S the conclusion, of this inference.
A calculus is a set of inference rules. An axiom of a calculus is any conclusion of the rule with 0 premises. A derivation of a sequent S in a calculus is a tree of sequents with the root S formed by inferences in the calculus. A proof is any nite derivation whose leaves are axioms. We shall speak about derivations of formulas ' is sequent calculi, meaning derivations of the sequents ! '. 3 Herbrand's theorem and related problems
Herbrand's theorem
Most automated reasoning methods for classical logic reduce, by means of skolemization, a given formula to a prenex form 9x'(x), where '(x) is quanti er free. For such formulas, provability is characterized by Herbrand's theorem. 9x((:P(a)^:P(b)) _ P(x)):
Then no formula of the form
is provable, but the disjunction
is provable. Herbrand's theorem holds both for logic with equality and logic without equality. It also holds for any rst-order theory axiomatized by universally quanti ed sentences.
Herbrand's theorem is directly used in several methods of automated deduction by means of the following loop.
1. guess a number n; 2. nd particular terms t 1 ; : : : ; t n ;
3. if such terms are not found, increase n and repeat step 2.
In the sequel we shall refer to methods using this loop as tableau-like methods.
Step 2 of this procedure gives rise to several decision problems.
Formula Instantiation
The rst relevant problem is the following.
Decision problem 1 (Herbrand Skeleton 36] ) Given a quanti er-free formula '(x) and a positive natural number n, do there exist term sequences t 1 ; : : : ; t n such that the formula '(t 1 ) _ : : : _ '(t n ) is provable?
We denote the Herbrand Skeleton problem for a signature by HS( ), and by HS( ) for logic with equality.
When n = 1, we have a special case of this problem.
Decision problem 2 (Formula Instantiation) Given a quanti er-free formula '(x), does there exist a single term sequence t such that the formula '(t) is provable?
In view of Theorem 3.2, both for Herbrand Skeleton and Formula Instantiation, term sequences t 1 ; : : : ; t n and t may be searched among ground terms of the signature of '.
We denote the Formula Instantiation problem for a signature by FI( ), and by FI( ) for logic with equality. Theorem 3.4 For every signature , the problem HS( ) (respectively HS( ) ) is decidable if and only if so is FI( ) (respectively FI( ) ).
Proof. Formula Instantiation is a special case of Herbrand Skeleton, when n = 1. To reduce Herbrand Skeleton to Formula Instantiation, for every instance (n; '(x)) of Herbrand Skeleton, take the instance '(x 1 ) _ : : : _ '(x n ) of Formula Instantiation. 2
The following theorem characterizes complexity of Formula Instantiation for logic without equality.
Theorem 3.5 For every signature with at least two symbols, FI( ) is p 2 -complete.
Proof. First, we show that FI( ) is in p 2 . Let '(x) be an instance of Formula Instantiation. Let us call a split of '(x) any equivalence relation on the set of atomic subformulas of '(x). We shall identify such equivalence relations with the sets of corresponding equivalence classes. Thus, any split can be considered as a set of sets of atomic subformulas of '(x).
Given a split S, we obtain from '(x) a propositional formula ' S as follows. Replace all atomic subformulas by propositional variables so that subformulas belonging to the same equivalence class of S are replaced by the same symbol, and subformulas belonging to di erent equivalence classes are replaced by di erent subformulas.
A split is called a justi cation of '(x) if 1. ' S is a tautology; 2. there exists a substitution such that for every equivalence class E 2 S and for every two formulas A; B 2 E we have A = B . Consider an example, developed from Example 3.3. Suppose '(x 1 ; x 2 ) is the formula (:P(a)^:P(b)) _ P(x 1 ) _ (:P(a)^:P(b)) _ P(x 2 ): Consider the split S with two equivalence classes: fP(a); P(x 1 )g and fP(b); P(x 2 )g: This split is a justi cation. Indeed, by replacing P(a); P(x 1 ) by the propositional letter A, and P(b); P(x 2 ) by the propositional letter B, we obtain the tautology ' S = (:A^:B) _ A _ (:A^:B) _ B: The corresponding substitution is x 1 7 ! a; x 2 7 ! b].
Is not hard to argue that the instance '(x) of Formula Instantiation holds if and only if there exists a justi cation of '(x). Let us now prove that the problem of the existence of a justi cation is in p 2 . This follows from the following observations: 1. all splits can be found by a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm; 2. the problem of checking, given a split S, whether ' S is a tautology, is co-NP-complete; 3. the problem of nding the appropriate substitution is polynomial-time (it is the so-called simultaneous uni cation problem known to be P-complete 13, 44, 14] ).
It remains to prove that Formula Instantiation is p 2 -hard. We prove this for the signature with two constants 0; 1. We use reduction of the QBF 2 problem known to be p 2 -complete, see e.g. 30].
This problem can be formulated as follows. Consider the algebra 2 with two elements 0; 1 in the signature with two constants 0; 1 representing these elements. Given a sentence of this signature 9x8y (x; y); (1) whose atomic formulas are of the form x i = 0; x i = 1; y j = 0; y j = 1, is this formula true in 2?
Given an instance (1) of QBF 2 , we construct the corresponding instance of Formula Instantiation as follows. The instance uses a unary predicate symbol P and propositional symbols Q 1 ; : : : ; Q m .
Denote by 0 the formula obtained from by replacing 
We claim that (1) is a yes-instance if and only if so is (2). It is not hard to argue that if (2) is satis ed by a substitution, then it is also satis ed by a substitution such that maps each variable to 0 or 1. Let be such a substitution.
Also, it is not hard to argue that satis es (2) if and only if 2 j = 8y (x ; y):
This proves the equivalence of (1) and (2). This proof also works for any other signature with at least two symbols, by replacing constants 0 and 1 by any two di erent ground terms.
2
It is easy to see from this proof that Formula Instantiation in the signature with one constant is co-NP-complete.
The discussion of Herbrand Skeleton and Formula Instantiation for logic with equality is postponed until section 4.
The Herbrand Skeleton problem has been de ned in 36] as a series of problems: for any xed n we have the Herbrand Skeleton (n) problem whose instances are (n; '). 36 (6) Suppose is a yes-instance of Formula Instantiation. Then there exists a substitution such that is ground and provable. Hence, 0 is unsatis able. In view of (6) 
Skeleton Instantiation
There exists another relevant problem: instantiation of a derivation skeleton to a valid derivation. One can de ne di erent notions of a derivation skeleton. In our case derivation skeletons are obtained from sequent-style derivations by removing all sequents (so that only names of inference rules remain), and omitting all applications of equality rules. Such skeletons and related decision problems are discussed in 38, 37] for logic without equality and in 39, 43] for intuitionistic logic with equality. We refer the reader to one of the above mentioned papers for thorough discussion and the precise de nition of skeletons. Here we shall only give examples illustrating the notion of a skeleton. We consider a standard sequent-style cut-free calculus with invertible rules 3 .
Examples of inference rules in this calculus are given below.
In the case of logic with equality, we also have three equality rules:
The skeleton of a derivation is the gure obtained from the derivation by removing all sequents and all applications of rules ( l ) and ( r ). For example, consider the derivation
It has the following skeleton.
Decision problem 4 (Skeleton Instantiation) Given a formula ' and a derivation skeleton S, does there exist a derivation of ' with the skeleton S?
We denote the Skeleton Instantiation problem for a signature by SI( ), and by SI( ) for logic with equality.
For logic without equality, 38] proves that Skeleton Instantiation is NP-complete. However, the proof of NP-hardness in 38] essentially uses the presence of a binary symbol in the signature. We give a new proof here, which is valid for any signature.
Theorem 3.7 SI( ; ; ) is NP-complete.
Proof. For a proof of containment in NP see 38]. The proof is not very complex, but requires the consideration of many small details. The main idea is that, given a skeleton, we can nondeterministically guess the principal formulas of inferences, and then to nd a substitution making this skeleton a valid derivation. Checking the existence of a substitution can be done in polynomial time by simultaneous uni cation plus solving so-called nonoccurrence constraints.
We now prove NP-hardness. The proof will use a polynomial-time reduction of the propositional satis ability problem known to be NP-complete and de ned as follows.
We call a clause any disjunction of literals. Instances of the propositional satis ability problem are conjunctions of clauses. An instance is a yes-instance if there exists a truth assignment that makes the conjunction true. Let ' = C 1^: : :^C n be an instance of the propositional satis ability problem. Let p 1 ; : : : ; p m be all propositional variables of '. Consider the signature consisting of two predicate symbols T and F. De De ne the formula = 8y8z(T(y)^F(z) 9x 1 : : :9x m ' 0 ): Consider also the skeleton S shown in Figure 1 . We claim that the pair ( ; S) is a yes-instance of Skeleton Instantiation if and only if ' is a yes-instance of the propositional satis ability problem.
It is not hard to argue that any derivation of ! ' with this skeleton has the form shown in Figure 2 , where is a substitution for variables x 1 ; : : : ; x m and 0; 1 are constants. Evidently, we can restrict to be of the form x 1 7 ! t 1 ; : : : ; x m 7 ! t m ], where ft 1 ; : : : ; t m g f0; 1g.
Consider an arbitrary substitution of this form and de ne the truth value assignment for p 1 ; : : : ; p m by (p i ) = x i . We leave it to the reader to check that the derivation of Figure 2 is a valid proof if and only if satis es each clause C i .
2
As for logic with equality, the following result is proved in 43].
Theorem 3.8 SI( ; y; z) is decidable if and only if so is FI(!; y; z) .
2
In fact, this theorem is stated in 43] for skeletons of intuitionistic derivations, but the proof works literally for classical derivations as well.
Simultaneous rigid E-uni cation
In this section we introduce a decision problem that can be considered as a combinatorial analogue of the problems we have discussed. This decision problem was introduced in 17] as simultaneous rigid E-uni cation, or SREU for short.
Decision problem 5 (Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation) Given nite sets of equations E i and equations s i t i , where i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, does there exist a substitution such that`V e2E i e s i t i for all i? We denote the Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation problem for a signature by SREU( ). Note that we de ne SREU( ) only for logic with equality.
We introduce some terminology related to simultaneous rigid E-uni cation. We call a rigid equation any expression of the form E`8 s t, where E is a nite set of equations and s; t are terms. In such a rigid equation, E is called its left-hand side and the equation s t its right-hand side. A system of rigid equations is a nite set of rigid equations. A solution to a rigid equation
. . .
This skeleton has n ? 1 applications of (!^) and m applications of (! 9). Each skeleton S i has the form
where k is the number of literals in the clause C i . E`8 s t is any substitution such that`V e2E i e s t . A solution to a system of rigid equations is any substitution that solves all rigid equations in the system.
Consider an example. In this example we denote applications of unary function symbols to arguments without parentheses, for example we write fx instead of f(x). 2. For every i 2 f1; : : : ; mg and j 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that A i has the form P(v 1 ; : : : ; v q ) and B j has the form P(w 1 ; : : : ; w q ) for the same predicate symbol P, the set R ' contains the system Next, we show how to reduce FI( ) to SREU( ). Let ' be a quanti er-free formula. Without loss of generality we assume that ' is in conjunctive normal form:
where ' i are disjunctions of literals. Constructs sets of systems of rigid equations R i = R ' i and de ne a set R of systems of rigid equations as follows: a system S belongs to R if and only if there exists S 1 2 R 1 ; : : : ; S k 2 R k such that S = S 1 : : : S k . Using Lemma 3.10, it is not hard to argue that ' is a yes-instance of Formula Instantiation if and only if some S 2 R is a yes-instance of Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation.
Since Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation is equivalent (with respect to decidability) to all other problems we study in this paper, we shall overview results about Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation.
A lemma on equational logic. Let us now formulate a lemma on equational logic that appears to be very useful in the study of Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation.
Let be a signature and c be a constant in . Denote by sig (x) the formulâ f2 f(c; : : : ; c) c x c:
Lemma 3.12 Let be a signature, c be a constant in and t be a term. Then the formula sig (t) is provable in LJ if and only if t is a ground term in .
2
Essentially, this lemma says that using rigid equations we can express the property \t is a ground term in a given signature ". For every signature and term t, denote by R (t) the following rigid equation:
ff(c; : : : ; c) c j f 2 g`8 t c; where c is any constant in . Lemma 3.12 immediately implies the following. Lemma 3.13 A substitution is a solution to R (t) if and only if t is a ground term in . 2 
Encodings of signatures
In this section we give encodings of some signatures in other signatures. These encodings will reduce signature-depending instances of simultaneous rigid E-uni cation to a nite number of signatures.
Binary signatures. We show how to encode terms in an arbitrary nite signature by terms in the signature (1; 0; 1). Without loss of generality we assume that the signature (1; 0; 1) consists of a constant a and a binary function symbol f. First, we de ne an encoding of natural numbers. For every natural number n de ne the term n in (1; 0; 1) as follows: 0 = f(f(a; a); a); n + 1 = f(n; a):
Now, let be an arbitrary signature with function symbols (including constants) g 1 ; : : : ; g n . For every term t in (respectively, tuple of terms t 1 ; : : : ; t n ), their binary encodings in (0; 1; 0), denoted B(t) (respectively, hti) are de ned by the following recursive de nitions:
B(x) = x; where x is a variable; hi = a; ht 1 ; : : : ; t m i = f(t 1 ; ht 2 ; : : : ; t m i); B(g i (t 1 ; : : : ; t m )) = f(a; f(m; ht 1 ; : : : ; t m i))
The main property of B(t) is the following.
Lemma 3.14 Let s; t be terms. 2
Using the binary encoding, we can reduce Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation to Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation in the signature with one constant and one binary function symbol. One can also use the encodings B(t) and U(t) to prove statements similar to Theorems 3.17 and 3.18. For example, Theorem 3.11 implies that FI( ; 2; 0) is polynomial-time equivalent to FI(1; 2; 0).
', where Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n are quanti ers and ' is a quanti er-free formula. Such a formula is called existencial if, in addition, all quanti ers Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n are 9. In classical logic, there is an e ective procedure (so-called prenexing) transforming each formula to an equivalent prenex formula. For this reason, the decision problem for prenex formulas of classical logic has been intensively studied and the complete classi cation of prenex fragments in terms of the signature, quanti er pre x and the presence of equality is known 5]. In intuitionistic logic it is not the case, so the value of prenex formulas is not evident.
Formally, we study the following problem.
Decision problem 6 (Prenex Intuitionistic) Is a given prenex sentence provable in intuition- Since intuitionistic propositional logic is already PSPACE-complete, this results also holds for subsets of PI( ) characterized by a restricted quanti er pre x.
For intuitionistic logic with equality, some results were sketched in 11], but without complete proofs. Here we give proofs of these results.
Our rst aim is to introduce a cut-free sequent calculus LJ 2 for intuitionistic logic in which all propositional derivations have a nite (and polynomial-size) depth. To this end, we rst de ne the \usual" calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic with equality, and then one additional calculus LJ 1 .
The calculus LJ is given in Figure 3 . The calculus LJ 1 is given in Figure 4 . The latter calculus (at least without equality rules) is a standard multi-succedent version of intuitionistic sequent calculus.
Though LJ is introduced as a calculus without cut rules, admissibility of cut can be proved by standard syntactic proofs of cut-eliminations, for example as in 28, 27] . We call inessential the rules ( l ), ( r ), ( ), (Ax) and (?), and essential all other rules. We call an equality derivation any derivation consisting of only applications of inessential rules and an essential derivation any derivation consisting of only applications of essential rules.
We call a derivation in any of these calculi regular if it satis es the following restrictions: above any application of ( l ) and ( r ) there may only be applications of inessential rules. LJ is a standard axiomatization for intuitionistic logic with equality. Thus, we can identify provability of a formula ' in intuitionistic logic with equality with provability of ! ' in LJ . Lemma (! 9) In this gure, A ranges over atomic formulas, '; ; range over arbitrary formulas, ?; range over nite multisets of formulas, and consists of at most one formula. In the rules (! 8) and (9 !) the constant c has no occurrences in the conclusions of the rules. (! 9) In this gure, A ranges over atomic formulas, '; ; range over arbitrary formulas, and ?; range over nite multisets of formulas. In the rules (! 8) and (9 !) the constant c has no occurrences in the conclusions of the rules. The proof is based on \down-permutability" of any inference with inferences by ( l ) and ( r ) and may be found in 29] (! 9) In this gure, all sequents satisfy the same conditions as for LJ 1 . In addition, the rules satisfy the following restrictions (we write ' 6 2 ? to denote that ' is not an element of the multiset ?). We are going to establish the completeness of LJ 2 with respect to regular derivations. Proof. We only consider three cases, other cases are analogous. This case is analogous to the previous one.
(c) ' 6 2 0 and 6 2 0 .
In this case we can use the inference (! 
2
Let be a regular derivation. The essential part of is the gure obtained from by removing all applications of inessential rules. Note that since is regular, the essential part of is an essential derivation (in any of the systems introduced so far). We call the depth of a derivation the length of the longest branch in . We call the essential depth of a regular derivation the depth of the essential part of . Lemma 3.28 Let ' be a quanti er-free formula with n subformulas and be an essential derivation of ' in LJ 2 . Then the depth of is at most n 2 .
Proof. Observe the following. If ? 1 ! 1 : : : ? n ! n ? ! ; n = 1; 2, is an inference in the essential part of , then for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng one of the two conditions is satis ed:
1. the number of di erent formulas in each ? i is strictly greater than the number of di erent formulas in ?; or 2. the number of di erent formulas each in ? i is equal to the number of di erent formulas in ?, and the number of di erent formulas in i is strictly greater than the number of di erent formulas in .
Since all formulas used in the derivation are subformulas of ', this implies the statement of the lemma. The proof of this lemma is straightforward.
The calculus LJ 2 has a polynomial depth derivation property for quanti er-free formulas and essential derivations. However, it is not directly applicable for the proof of the equivalence of Existencial Intuitionistic and Formula Instantiation. The problem is that derivations of propositional formulas are not closed under substitutions: there exists derivations and substitutions such that is not a derivation. We introduce one more calculus LJ 3 that is similar to LJ 2 , but closed under substitutions.
The calculus LJ 3 is obtained from LJ 2 by dropping all restrictions to the inference rules and replacement of (! 2 ) by a rule (! 0 2 ) de ned below. To de ne this new inference rule, we rst introduce the notion of a disagreement between any two formulas. Let '; be quanti er-free formulas. A disagreement between ' and , denoted D('; ) is the set of equations de ned as follows.
1. If ' = = ?, then D('; ) = ;. 2. If ' = P(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) and = P(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ), then D('; ) = fs 1 t 1 ; : : : ; s n t n g. Where D(' 1 ; ' 2 ) = fs 1 t 1 ; : : : ; s n t n g.
Using Lemmas 3.27 and 3.28, it is not hard to show the following.
Lemma 3.30 Every formula provable in LJ 3 is provable in LJ . Every formula ' provable in LJ has a regular derivation in LJ 3 of essential depth at most n 2 , where n is the number of subformulas in '. 2
The next lemma reduces Formula Instantiation for intuitionistic logic to Formula Instantiation in classical logic. Lemma 3.31 Let ' be a quanti er-free formula of a signature . Then there exists a nite set of formulas f 1 ; : : : ; m g of the same signature with the following property. For every substitution , the formula ' is provable in intuitionistic logic if and only if for some i 2 f1; : : : ; mg, the formula i is provable in classical logic.
Proof. Let n be the number of subformulas of ' (note that n is also the number of subformulas of every formula of the form ' ). By Lemma 3.30, if ' is provable in intuitionistic logic, then it has a regular derivation with the essential depth at most n 2 . Consider all essential derivations of ' in LJ 2 of depth n 2 . Denote these derivations by 1 ; : : : ; m . Take any of these essential derivations i . Let the top sequents of this derivation be S 1 ; : : : ; S k . Then we de ne the formula i to be lit(S 1 )^: : :^lit(S k ).
Let us now prove that the formulas i satisfy the statement. . Since i is provable in classical logic, every formula lit(S j ) is also provable. By Lemma 3.29, every sequent S j has a proof in LJ 3 . Since i is an essential derivation in LJ 3 of a quanti er-free formula ' from S 1 ; : : : ; S m , we have that i is an essential derivation in LJ 3 of the formula ' from S 1 ; : : : ; S m . Therefore, ' is provable in LJ 3 . By Lemma 3.30, ' is provable in LJ .
The following property of intuitionistic provability can be easily proved by examining derivations in LJ : Lemma By routine inspection of derivations of ' in LJ one can prove the following:
( ) The formula ' is provable in LJ if and only if there exist a sequence of terms T = (t i ) i2E in the signatures i , respectively, such that the formula T is provable in LJ . x(y; g(y)) f(g(z); a; y) (9) It has at least the following solutions: In general, the solutions to (9) are the substitutions x 7 ! w 1 w 2 :t x ; y 7 ! t y ; z 7 ! t z ] that satisfy the following conditions: (a1) t x is a term built from ff; g; a; w 1 ; w 2 g; (a2) t y is a term built from ff; g; ag; (a3) t z is a term built from ff; g; ag; (a4) If we replace w 1 by t y and w 2 by g(t y ); then t x becomes f(g(t z ); a; t y ):
We shall treat w 1 ; w 2 as constants. Lemma 3.13 shows how to represent all terms of a given signature by rigid equations, allowing us to encode properties (a1){(a3). Terms as words. We consider signatures F C where F is nite set of unary function symbols and C is a nite set of constants. In this section we write terms in such signatures using the reversed Polish notation: f 1 (f 2 (: : :f n (c))) is written as cf n : : :f 2 f 1 .
Hence, every ground term in F C has the form cW where c is a constant and W is a word on F. Using Lemma 3.13, we can express the property \x starts with a constant c". Therefore, we can use word variables in rigid equations, e.g. cvf cu`8 cg cv where u; v are word variables.
Representation of some word problems
In this section we show how to represent some word problems using monadic SREU. 
Results
Here we cite main results of 9, 20, 21] . Some of these results have nontrivial proofs, so we describe only the main ideas of the proofs.
By Lemma 5.1, we can describe any regular set as a set of solutions to a rigid equation with a ground left-hand side and one variable. It is also not hard to represent solutions to such equations as regular sets. This implies that monadic SREU with ground left-hand sides and one variable is polynomial-time equivalent to the intersection nonemptiness problem for DFA. This proves the The idea of the proof is the following. It is shown that solutions to rigid equations with ground left-hand sides can be described by word equations plus restrictions that word variables belong to regular sets. Then the result of 32] on the decidability of word equations with regular constraints is used.
As for the general case, the decidability remains an open problem. 20] proves polynomial-time equivalence of monadic SREU to a word problem described below.
Denote by W a set of pairs of words on F. Introduce on W a binary function , a unary function r and a binary relation in the following way: (U; V ) (V; W) = (U; W); (U 1 ; U 2 ) r = (U 2 ; U 1 ); (U; V ) (UW; V W):
An ideal on W is any set of pairs containing the pair of empty words ("; "), closed under functions and r and upward closed under . The ideal generated by a set of pairs S, denoted ideal(S) is de ned as the least ideal containing S. Assume that s is the only function symbol of such a signature. Then a word s n represents the natural number n. Concatenation of words becomes the addition operation + on numbers, the power relation \s k = (s m ) n for some natural number n" represents the divisibility relation m j k.
It follows from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 that Monadic SREU with one unary symbol can represent the so-called Diophantine problem for addition and divisibility, i.e., the problem of solvability of expressions using 0; 1; + and j over natural numbers.
In 9] a reduction of SREU( ; 1; 0) to the Diophantine problem for addition and divisibility is given. The latter problem is known to be decidable 3, 26, 24] . This implies Theorem 5.8 SREU( ; 1; 0) is decidable.
2 The precise complexity of SREU( ; 1; 0) is not known, as well as the precise complexity of the Diophantine problem for addition and divisibility 25].
Another decidable fragment
Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation with two variables is undecidable. For the one-variable case, the following result is known 6, 7]: Theorem 6.1 SREU( ; ; 1) with one variable is DEXPTIME-complete.
2
The proof of 6] is based on polynomial-time reductions between Simultaneous Rigid E-uni cation and the intersection nonemptiness problem for bottom-up tree automata 33]. This theorem implies the following consequences for other decision problems discussed in our article. Theorem 6.2 Formula Instantiation and Matrix Instantiation with one variable are decidable. The 8 98 -fragment of intuitionistic logic with equality is decidable. 2 
Conclusion
The known results on the decision problems explained in this article are summarized in Table 1 .
The following two problems are still open:
the decidability of Monadic SREU;
The decidability of SREU with two rigid equations.
As is follows from the table, the precise complexity of some problems is also unknown.
Other open problems related to the Herbrand theorem and its use in automated reasoning are discussed in 42].
